

1. Mr. Hanes
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INFORMAL MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF DIRECTOR AND CONSULTANTS
INTERDEPARTMENTAL FOREIGN INFORMATION ORGANIZATION
November 6, 1950, 8:30 p.m. at home of Director

PRESENT: Department of State - Mr. Barrett, Director
Mr. Stone, Executive Secretary
Mr. Oechsner
Mr. Phillips
Mr. Hulten
Department of Defense - General Magruder
Joint Chiefs of Staff - Admiral Stevens
Department of the Army - Col. Young
National Security Resources Board - Mr. Sheppard
Central Intelligence Agency - Mr. Wisner
Economic Cooperation Administration - Mr. Berding

The major question discussed at this special meeting was the situation in Korea, with particular reference to intervention of Communist China. Following general discussion, the consensus regarding Chinese intervention appeared to be as follows:

1. Chinese Communist leaders are probably motivated, in part, by genuine fear that we have aggressive intentions of going beyond the Korean frontier and by fears regarding such things as the power plants on the Yalu River. The feeling was that the Russians have probably encouraged these fears by falsified "intelligence" reports and the like. There was a feeling also that our failure to give adequate assurances regarding the power plants, and the statements of some of our generals, have contributed to these fears.

2. Even if the action of the Chinese Communists arises from long-laid plans for full intervention in Korea, which is possible, they have found it necessary to conduct a mammoth propaganda campaign at home and abroad to show our aggressive intentions and to justify their actions. We should seek to undermine this propaganda.

3. It should be noted that the Chinese have not yet irrevocably committed themselves to large-scale overt intervention in Korea and, given normal Chinese conduct, will be cautious about committing themselves to a degree where they cannot pull back if the occasion warrants.

In view of these considerations, the following tentative conclusions and recommendations were advanced:

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State Department review completed

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1. We should be sure to use every conceivable diplomatic and backdoor approach to the Chinese--including Scandinavian diplomats and those of other countries to communicate:

(a) Assurance that we and other UN forces have no aggressive intentions regarding Manchuria and China, plus clarification regarding the power plants, and

(b) A warning that if the Chinese persist in intervention, they will face incalculable dangers.

2. In addition to the UN resolution now being prepared, there should be incorporated in it or in another resolution the same two points of assurance and (implied) warning.

3. We should consider using Ambassador Leighton Stuart, because of his wide following in China, on the Voice of America, with a broadcast along these same lines.

4. We should use channels immediately, to spread among the Chinese the story that if they persist in their present course they will be up against a much tougher U. S. (and probably UN) position on Formosa, possible U. S. and UN participation in Indochina, a really intensified coastal blockade, and perhaps even atom bombing.

5. We should make a concentrated effort, when the Chinese Communist delegates to UN arrive here about November 15, to arrange quiet, informal meetings between them and various personalities who are known to them, to get this same message across.

6. Consideration should be given to an open letter to the Chinese delegation to appear in the New York Times or the Washington Post at the time the delegation arrives here.

7. We should explore actively the possibilities of using the 5,000 Chinese students in this country to try to get the same message across.

The general feeling was that the current situation is highly explosive and that no effort should be spared to get the true facts across to the Chinese Government and people.

Upon conclusion of the discussion of Korea, the following additional matters were mentioned.

1. Mr. Barrett requested the Executive Secretary to distribute a statement of the functions of IFIS for comment and approval

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Mr. Phillips reported briefly on a State Department discussion of "Psychological Approaches to the USSR" with the Ideological Panel of the United States Advisory Commission on Information. The panel included Alex Inkeles, Elmer Davis, George Gallup, Allen Dulles and George Counts. It was agreed that Mr. Phillips would distribute a summary of the transcript to members of the Board.

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